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Healthy and Safe Swimming Week 
— May 18–24, 2015
May 18–24, 2015, marks the 11th annual Healthy and 
Safe Swimming Week (formerly known as Recreational 
Water Illness and Injury Prevention Week). This observance 
highlights ways in which swimmers, parents, pool owners and 
operators, beach managers, and public health can maximize 
the health benefits of water-based physical activity, while 
minimizing the risk for recreational water–associated illness 
and injury. More information is available at http://www.cdc.
gov/healthywater/observances/hss-week/index.html.
This year’s theme, “Make a Healthy Splash: Share the Fun, 
Not the Germs,” focuses on a few easy and effective steps 
swimmers and parents can take to protect themselves and 
their families and friends from infectious pathogens in pools, 
waterparks, hot tubs, spas, and water playgrounds. These steps 
are highlighted in CDC’s new Healthy Swimming brochure, 
available with other free promotional materials at http://
www.cdc.gov/healthywater/swimming/resources/index.html.
CDC also released the 1st Edition of the Model Aquatic 
Health Code in August 2014 (1), a voluntary guidance 
document that can help state and local authorities and the 
aquatics sector make swimming and other water activities 
healthier and safer. The first Conference for the Model 
Aquatic Health Code (CMAHC) will be held October 6–7, 
2015, in Scottsdale, Arizona, where CMAHC members* 
can vote on potential MAHC changes. A public health com-
munications toolkit for Healthy and Safe Swimming Week is 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/observances/
hss-week/response-tools-public-health.html.
* More information on how to become a CMAHC member is available at 
http://www.cmahc.org/membership.php.
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Norovirus Outbreak Associated 
with a Natural Lake Used for 
Recreation — Oregon, 2014
Amy Zlot, MPH1, Maayan Simckes, MPH1,2, Jennifer Vines, MD1, 
Laura Reynolds, MPH1, Amy Sullivan PhD1, Magdalena Kendall 
Scott, MPH3, J. Michael McLuckie1, Dan Kromer, MPA4, Vincent R. 
Hill, PhD5, Jonathan S. Yoder, MPH5, Michele C. Hlavsa, MPH5 
(Author affiliations at end of text)
In July 2014, Multnomah County public health officials 
investigated a norovirus outbreak among persons visiting 
Blue Lake Regional Park in Oregon. During the weekend 
of the reported illnesses (Friday, July 11–Sunday, July 13) 
approximately 15,400 persons visited the park. The investigation 
identified 65 probable and five laboratory-confirmed cases of 
norovirus infection (70 total cases). No hospitalizations or 
deaths were reported. Analyses from a retrospective cohort study 
revealed that swimming at Blue Lake during July 12–13 was 
significantly associated with illness during July 13–14 (adjusted 
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relative risk = 2.3; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.1–64.9). 
Persons who swam were more than twice as likely to become 
ill compared with those who did not swim in the lake. To 
control the outbreak, Blue Lake was closed for 10 days to 
prevent further illness. This investigation underscores the 
need for guidance for determining when to reopen untreated 
recreational water venues (e.g., lakes) associated with outbreaks, 
and communication tools to inform the public about the risks 
associated with swimming in untreated recreational water 
venues and measures that can prevent illness.
On July 14, Multnomah County Health Department 
(MCHD) was notified of 13 cases of acute gastrointestinal 
illness among members of three separate groups who had 
visited Blue Lake Regional Park over the previous weekend, 
July 11–13. MCHD began to investigate the potential outbreak 
to identify risk factors for illness, and develop and implement 
control measures to prevent additional illness.
The park, located just outside of Portland (Multnomah 
County), is a popular destination for city residents during the 
summer. The park has a lake for swimming, picnic grounds, 
paddleboats, and a splash pad (a chlorinated spray ground with 
features that shower and pour water). During the weekend of 
the reported illnesses, approximately 1,700 persons visited the 
park on Friday, July 11; 7,700 on Saturday, July 12; and 6,000 
on Sunday, July 13, thousands more visitors compared with 
an average summer weekend.
Epidemiologic Investigation
To control the outbreak, Blue Lake was closed for 10 days 
to prevent other illness. Telephone interviews of both ill and 
non-ill persons were conducted as part of a retrospective cohort 
study using contact information for persons on the reservations 
list for the park picnic grounds during the weekend of interest, 
July 11–July 13. Persons who had made the reservations 
were contacted by MCHD and asked to provide contact 
information for up to eight persons in their group; 139 persons 
were identified. State and Portland metro-area local health 
departments (Clackamas, Clark, Multnomah, and Washington 
counties) interviewed 109 (78%) of the 139 persons. A 
probable case was defined as any vomiting or diarrhea with 
onsets 7–45 hours after visiting the park, in a person who 
visited the park on July 11, 12, or 13. A confirmed case was 
defined as meeting the probable case definition and having 
laboratory-confirmed norovirus infection. Because this was a 
high profile outbreak and was heavily covered in the media, 
MCHD received 52 additional reports of illness from persons 
who contacted MCHD and other local health departments 
with symptoms consistent with norovirus infection but they 
were not included in the retrospective cohort study because 
they were not identified through the reservation list. The 
investigation identified 65 probable and five laboratory-
confirmed cases of norovirus infection (70 total cases).
In the cohort study, approximately 17% (18 of 109) of 
participants met the case definition; 10 (56%) reported having 
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any diarrhea and 14 (78%) reported vomiting. The median 
incubation period was 31 hours (range = 7–45 hours), and the 
median duration of illness was 10 hours (range = 4–24 hours). 
However, at the time of their interview, three persons reported 
that their symptoms had not yet resolved. No hospitalizations 
or deaths were reported.
The percentage of visitors who were at the lake on Saturday, 
July 12 and became ill was 25% (17 of 68 persons) (Figure). 
Only one person who visited the lake on Sunday became ill, 
and no Friday visitors became ill. Those who became ill were 
significantly younger than those who were not ill (Table 1). 
Swimming (including immersion under water or wading in 
the lake), using the splash pad, boating, and younger age (aged 
4–10 years) were each significantly associated with becoming ill 
in bivariate analyses (Table 2). However, when all of these risk 
factors were assessed simultaneously in one logistic regression 
model to calculate adjusted relative risk estimates, only swim-
ming remained significantly associated with illness. Persons 
who swam were 2.3 times (95% CI = 1.1–4.9) more likely to 
become ill compared with those who did not swim in the lake 
(Table 2). The attributable risk for swimming in the lake was 
91.3% (95% CI = 87.9%–93.2%).
TABLE 1. Demographic characteristics of cases and non-cases,* 
outbreak of norovirus at Blue Lake Recreational Area — Oregon, 2014 
Chacteristic
Age† (yrs) Gender§ (%)
Median Range Female Male
Cases 10 4–27 72.2 27.8
Non-cases 31 1–68 62.9 37.1
* N = 109 persons interviewed; cases are defined as persons reporting onset of 
illness (vomiting or diarrhea) and non-cases are defined as those persons not 
reporting illness.
† p-value = 0.0002.
§ p-value = 0.45.   
FIGURE. Cases of norovirus infection* associated with recreational activities at Blue Lake Regional Park, Multnomah County, by date and time 
of onset of symptoms — Oregon, July 11–14, 2014
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* N = 18.
† On Saturday, July 7, there were thousands more visitors compared to an average summer Saturday.
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The mechanism by which the lake became contaminated is 
unknown; however, a swimmer’s vomit or fecal incident in the 
lake over the weekend, probably on Saturday, July 12, could 
explain the point source outbreak pattern (Figure).
Laboratory Testing
Five ill persons provided stool specimens, which all tested 
positive for norovirus genogroup I by polymerase chain 
reaction. These specimens also tested negative for Salmonella, 
Shigella, Escherichia coli O157:H7, and Campylobacter.
Environmental Health Investigation
Blue Lake, just south of the Columbia River, is a natural 
lake, about 25 feet (7.6 m) at its deepest, but about half of the 
lake, including the swimming area, is 10 feet (3.0 m) deep or 
less. The beach area itself is a small area, approximately 300 
feet long by 30 feet wide (91.4 m by 9.1 m). The water along 
the beach is shallow. Bubblers were installed in the swimming 
area to circulate water from the center of the lake into the 
swimming area. Before the outbreak, the bubblers were in 
operation and were working as designed. The lake is monitored 
for fecal contamination twice-weekly during May–September. 
MCHS was notified of a high E. coli result from the shallow 
swimming area at Blue Lake on July 16. The E. coli count was 
304, above the safety threshold of 235. A follow-up sample, 
collected on July 17, did not violate Oregon water quality 
standards. Samples collected from July 14 were also below 
the threshold and considered safe, as were samples leading 
up to the outbreak. The laboratory does not conduct species 
identification tests. The positive test is a general indicator of 
fecal contamination, of which an animal or human could be 
the source. Because the timing of the fecal coliform elevation 
occurred after the outbreak, this spike in fecal contamination 
was determined to be unrelated to the norovirus outbreak. Blue 
Lake Regional Park is on a sewage system versus a septic tank 
system. Multnomah County Environmental Health conducted 
an evaluation of the park after notification of illness and did 
not find any signs of failure of the sewage system. Blue Lake 
uses well water for watering the large land area, but uses a 
public water source for drinking water and for their facilities.
Blue Lake proactively closed the beach to swimming, 
paddleboat, and fishing activities from Monday, July 14 until 
Wednesday, July 23; however, the picnic grounds and splash 
pad remained open during this period. On July 23, MCHD 
and the Oregon Public Health Division sampled lake water 
by pumping approximately 90 L from different areas of the 
swimming area through each of two hollow-fiber ultrafilters 
(1). Two samples (100 mL each) were also collected for E. coli 
testing. Ultrafilter samples were sent to CDC, which reported 
on July 30 that the samples had negative results for norovirus 
using real-time reverse transcription-PCR testing (2). E. coli 
concentrations in the tested samples were below state and 
federal ambient water quality standards.
Discussion
On the basis of symptom profiles, illness incubation and 
duration periods, and positive stool specimens, norovirus 
(a human pathogen) was the likely etiology of this outbreak. 
On the basis of the statistically significant epidemiologic link 
to swimming in Blue Lake, the lake was likely the outbreak 
TABLE 2. Relative risk and rates of illness from norovirus, by exposure, in persons* during outbreak of norovirus at Blue Lake Recreational Area 
— Oregon, 2014
Characteristic
Exposed to risk factor Not exposed to risk factor
Relative risk model
Adjusted relative 
risk model % ill persons 
exposed to risk 
factor
Ill Not ill Ill Not ill
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) Risk (95% CI) p-value Risk (95% CI) p-value
Swam 13 (54.2) 11 (45.8) 5 (5.9) 80 (94.1) 9.2 (3.6–23.4) <0.001 2.3 (1.1–4.9)† 0.02 72.2
Used the splash pad 11 (31.4) 24 (68.6) 7 (9.5) 67 (90.5) 3.3 (1.4–7.8) 0.0039 1.4 (0.6–3.0)§ 0.51 61.1
Boated 10 (71.4) 4 (28.6) 8 (8.4) 87 (91.6) 8.5 (4.0–17.8) <0.001 1.8 (0.7–4.7)¶ 0.22 55.6
Aged 4–10 years 
versus 11+ years
14 (28) 36 (72) 4 (6.8) 55 (93.2) 1.3 (1.1–1.6) 0.0039 1.5 (0.7–3.3)** 0.3 77.8
Drank from drinking 
fountain
16 (17.2) 77 (82.8) 2 (12.5) 14 5 (87.5) 1.4 (0.3– 5.4) 0.27 NA NA NA 88.9
Ate any food 16 (16.2) 83 (83.8) 2 (25) 6 (75) 0.6 (0.2– 2.3) 0.52 NA NA NA 88.9
Used the restroom 13 (16.7) 65 (83.3) 2 (8.3) 22 (91.7) 2.0 (0.5–8.2) 0.17 NA NA NA 86.7
Played on play 
structure
5 (20.8) 19 (79.2) 13 (15.3) 72 (84.7) 1.4 (0.5–3.4) 0.52 NA NA NA 27.8
Abbreviation: NA = not applicable; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval.
 * N = 109; however, counts used to calculate measures might not add up to 109 because of missing data.
 † Controlled for boating, splash pad, and age.
 § Controlled for swimming, boating, and age.
 ¶ Controlled for swimming, splash pad, and age.
 ** Controlled for swimming, splash pad, and boating.  
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source.* Although, the mechanism by which the lake became 
contaminated is unknown, the most likely cause, based on 
the point source outbreak pattern, was a swimmer’s vomit 
or fecal incident in the lake over the weekend, probably on 
Saturday, July 12. If a swimmer had a vomit or fecal incident 
in the lake on Saturday, July 12, the illness counts, by day of 
visit to the lake, suggest that the bubblers might have helped 
limit transmission to primarily Saturday, July 12 via dilution.†
During the previous 15 years, Blue Lake has been the source 
of other acute gastrointestinal illness outbreaks during the 
summer months. In 1991, Blue Lake was linked to a dual-
pathogen outbreak (21 cases of E. coli O157:H7 and 59 cases 
of Shigella infection). In 2004, norovirus caused an outbreak 
associated with swimming in Blue Lake; this outbreak affected 
>100 persons (3,4). In addition, in the summer months Blue 
Lake often closes because of the presence of blue-green algae 
that can produce toxins harmful to humans and animals.
Because of the small beach area and the sheer numbers of park 
visitors, the bather load was high the weekend of the outbreak 
exposure. The effects of high bather load were likely exacerbated 
by the high temperatures (upwards of 90°F or 32°C), the 
potentially poor water circulation within the beach area, and 
the fact that shallow beach areas attract young children, among 
whom norovirus is the leading cause of medically attended acute 
gastroenteritis in the United States (5,6). Children also can be 
at higher risk for exposure because they are more likely to ingest 
water while swimming (7). In addition, there is no method 
to chemically treat the lake, allowing contamination and the 
potential of transmission to persist.
Because there are no evidence-based remediation steps for 
untreated recreational water venues as there are for treated 
recreational water venues (e.g., pools), public health officials 
found it challenging to come to a clear consensus on when 
to reopen the lake. There is evidence that noroviruses can 
survive in water for several months and possibly years (8). 
Consequently, MCHD relied on commonsense strategies 
(e.g., waiting multiple incubation periods to ensure illness had 
subsided) and the expertise of health officers to decide when 
to reopen the lake. Public health agencies could benefit from 
the development of evidence-based criteria to determine when 
to reopen untreated recreational water venues associated with 
outbreaks (e.g., venue-specific water quality regression models).
Preventing and controlling such outbreaks also calls for 
engaging the swimming public, who represent a key source of 
recreational water contamination. Blue Lake has policies in 
place to prevent high-risk situations, including biweekly water 
testing for fecal contamination, installing bubblers to increase 
water circulation, and banning children aged <5 years§ from the 
beach area to limit vomiting and fecal incidents in the water, 
policies which existed before the outbreak. However, these 
strategies alone cannot eliminate the risk of contamination 
of recreational water, and more proactive (i.e., pre-outbreak) 
dissemination of messages that promote healthy swimming 
are needed. Because of the disproportionate reporting of 
outbreaks associated with treated recreational water venues, 
CDC has historically focused on developing healthy swimming 
promotion resources for treated venues.¶ However, as this 
outbreak highlights, healthy swimming promotion resources 
for untreated recreational water venues are also needed. Such 
resources would need to balance raising awareness of the 
health benefits of aquatic-based physical activity and outdoor 
recreation with informing the swimming public of steps that it 
can take to minimize potential risks of swimming in untreated 
recreational water (9). To optimize the effectiveness of healthy 
swimming messages specific to untreated recreational water 
venues, public health experts need to better understand how the 
swimming public perceives these venues and their associated 
risk of infection, particularly given the communal nature 
of swimming. Thus, understanding the public’s knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices surrounding untreated recreational 
water could be the first step to preventing illness.
* The water, and thus the tested samples, might have no longer been contaminated 
by norovirus 11 days after Saturday, July 12, or the contamination levels in the 
samples might have fallen below the level of detection.
† Based on the hypothesis that a swimmer had a vomit or fecal incident in the 
lake on Saturday, July 12, and 17 of 18 illnesses occurred in persons who 
visited the lake Saturday, but only one illness occurred in a person who visited 
the lake on Sunday.
§ CDC does not recommend banning children aged <5 years from recreational 
water venues as a strategy to prevent recreational water–associated illness outbreaks.
¶ More information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/swimming/
resources/index.html. 
What is already known on this topic?
Nationally and internationally, norovirus outbreaks have been 
associated with untreated recreational water venues, such as 
lakes. During 2009–2010, the most recent years for which 
finalized data are available, there were 81 recreational water–
associated disease outbreaks, 24 of them associated with 
untreated recreational water.
What is added by this report?
In July 2014, a norovirus outbreak associated with Blue Lake 
Regional Park in Oregon affected 70 persons. Swimming in the lake 
was significantly associated with illness; thus, the lake was closed 
for 11 days to swimming, paddleboat, and fishing activities.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Public health officials could greatly benefit from guidance for 
determining when to reopen untreated recreational water 
venues associated with outbreaks and public-facing health 
communication resources that promote healthy swimming and 
prevent recreational water–associated illness.
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From 2000 to 2011, the rate of unintentional drug poison-
ing (overdose) deaths involving opioid analgesics increased 
435% in Staten Island, from 2.0 to 10.7 per 100,000 residents. 
During 2005–2011, disparities widened between Staten Island 
and the other four New York City (NYC) boroughs (Bronx, 
Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens) (1); in 2011, the rate 
in Staten Island was 3.0–4.5 times higher than in the other 
boroughs. In response, the NYC Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) implemented a comprehensive 
five-part public health strategy, with both citywide and Staten 
Island–targeted efforts: 1) citywide opioid prescribing guide-
lines, 2) a data brief for local media highlighting Staten Island 
mortality and prescribing data, 3) Staten Island town hall 
meetings convened by the NYC commissioner of health and 
meetings with Staten Island stakeholders, 4) a Staten Island 
campaign to promote prescribing guidelines, and 5) citywide 
airing of public service announcements with additional airing 
in Staten Island. Concurrently, the New York state legislature 
enacted the Internet System for Tracking Over-Prescribing 
(I-STOP), a law requiring prescribers to review the state 
prescription monitoring system before prescribing controlled 
substances. This report describes a 29% decline in the opioid 
analgesic–involved overdose death rate in Staten Island from 
2011 to 2013, while the rate did not change in the other four 
NYC boroughs, and compares opioid analgesic prescribing data 
for Staten Island with data for the other boroughs. Targeted 
public health interventions might be effective in lowering 
opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality rates.
In NYC, the rate of opioid analgesic–involved overdose deaths 
increased 57% from 2005 to 2011, from 2.1 to 3.3 per 100,000 
residents. While rates increased citywide, the rate in Staten 
Island increased 257% during the same period, from 3.0 to 
10.7 per 100,000 residents (Figure). In April 2011, DOHMH 
reported citywide opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality, 
highlighting the disproportionately high rates in Staten Island 
(2). This report received substantial media coverage, particularly 
among Staten Island local news outlets. In November 2011, 
DOHMH published opioid prescribing guidelines for general 
medical providers with the following key messages: 1) a 3-day 
supply of short-acting opioid analgesic is usually sufficient for 
acute pain, 2) avoid prescribing opioid analgesics for chronic 
noncancer pain, 3) avoid high-dose opioid analgesic prescrip-
tions, and 4) avoid prescribing opioid analgesics to patients 
taking benzodiazepines (3). In January 2013, DOHMH released 
opioid prescribing guidelines for emergency departments (4) that 
were adopted citywide by 39 emergency departments, including 
both of Staten Island’s hospitals.
Throughout 2013, DOHMH met in Staten Island with local 
hospital, addiction treatment, and syringe exchange programs, 
as well as local politicians to share overdose mortality trends 
and guidelines. In June 2013, the commissioner of health 
held two conferences for Staten Island physicians on judicious 
opioid prescribing. These guidelines were promoted to Staten 
Island prescribers via one-to-one office educational visits in 
which DOHMH recommendations, resources, and tools were 
disseminated. During 2012–2014, DOHMH aired two television 
advertisements highlighting the risks of opioid analgesics citywide, 
with additional airtime in Staten Island. These interventions 
occurred in close temporal proximity to the enactment and media 
coverage of I-STOP, state legislation implemented in August 2013 
that requires providers to consult the state Prescription Monitoring 
Program, a registry of controlled-substance prescriptions filled by 
New Yorkers, before prescribing or dispensing Schedule II, III, or 
IV controlled substances.
To evaluate the impact of the public health interventions, 
DOHMH assessed changes in unintentional opioid analgesic–
involved overdose mortality rates and changes in opioid analgesic 
prescribing patterns. Mortality data were derived from two 
linked sources, NYC death certificates and toxicology findings 
from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. Deaths were 
defined as unintentional drug poisoning (overdose) if the medical 
examiner determined manner of death as accidental and the 
underlying or multiple cause code was assigned an ICD-10 code 
of X40–X44, F11–F16, or F18–F19 (excluding F-codes with 
0.2 or 0.6 third digit). Toxicology metabolites were abstracted 
from medical examiner files and linked to death certificate data.
Toxicology findings were used to describe the drugs involved 
in overdose deaths. Methadone-involved overdose deaths 
were reported separately, because there are approximately 
30,000 New Yorkers maintained on methadone for opioid use 
disorders. Staten Island opioid analgesic–involved overdose 
rates were compared with the other four NYC boroughs 
combined. Overall, overdose rates also were assessed to 
determine whether changes in opioid analgesic–involved 
overdose rates were offset by changes in other drug poisonings, 
principally heroin.
Decrease in Rate of Opioid Analgesic Overdose Deaths — 
Staten Island, New York City, 2011–2013
Denise Paone, EdD1, Ellenie Tuazon, MPH1, Jessica Kattan, MD1, Michelle L. Nolan, MPH1, Daniella Bradley O’Brien1, Deborah Dowell, MD2, 
Thomas A. Farley, MD3, Hillary V. Kunins, MD1 (Author affiliations at end of text)
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Data for opioid analgesic prescriptions filled by NYC residents 
were derived from the New York State Prescription Monitoring 
Program. DOHMH assessed median day supply and the fill rates of 
prescriptions and high morphine equivalent–dose prescriptions (>100 
morphine milligram equivalents) (5) by borough of patient residence.
Age-adjusted rates were calculated using NYC population 
estimates for the period 2000–2013 and the U.S. Census 2000 
standard population. To evaluate the impact of the public health 
interventions, prescription rates were compared annually and for 
the fourth quarters (October–December) during 2011–2013. 
Given that both office educational visits with Staten Island 
prescribers and implementation of I-STOP occurred in the third 
quarter of 2013, the fourth quarter of 2013 was compared with 
the fourth quarters of 2011 and 2012. Rate changes were tested 
using z-tests and 95% confidence intervals; comparisons were 
based on gamma confidence intervals distribution (6).
From 2000 to 2011, Staten Island residents had the 
highest rate of opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality 
in NYC. From 2005 to 2011, the rate increased 257% in 
Staten Island, compared with a 44% increase in the other 
four boroughs combined. After implementation of the public 
health initiatives, opioid analgesic mortality rates decreased 
29% from 2011 to 2013, from 10.7 to 7.6 per 100,000 
Staten Island residents (Table 1). In comparison, the rate for 
the other four boroughs combined did not change from 2011 
to 2013 (2.6 per 100,000 residents, for both years). Among 
Staten Island residents, the rate of heroin-involved overdose 
deaths fluctuated but had a net increase of 39% from 2011 to 
2013, from 6.2 in 2011 to 8.6 per 100,000 residents in 2013. 
Among the other four boroughs combined, heroin-involved 
overdose deaths increased 35% during the same period (from 
3.7 in 2011 to 5.0 per 100,000 residents in 2013). In Staten 
Island, overall drug-involved overdose deaths decreased 4% 
from 2011 to 2013, from a rate of 18.4 to 17.6 per 100,000 
residents. During that period, the rate for the other four 
boroughs increased 20%, from 7.9 to 9.5 per 100,000.
The median day supply for filled opioid analgesic 
prescriptions for Staten Island residents was unchanged during 
2011–2013 (30 days). In contrast, the median day supply for 
the other four boroughs was lower, but increased from 2011 
to 2013, from 15 to 20 days (Table 2).
In 2011, Staten Island residents filled opioid analgesic 
prescriptions at a higher rate (502.0 per 1,000 residents) than 
did residents of the other four boroughs (236.7) and filled 
high-dose prescriptions at rates three times higher (132.4) 
than residents of the other boroughs (40.7) (Table 2). In 2012, 
the rate of opioid analgesic prescriptions filled decreased in all 
boroughs, whereas rates of high-dose prescriptions increased 
slightly. Compared with 2011, in 2013 the opioid analgesic 
prescriptions fill rate continued to decrease for residents of 
all boroughs, by 9.8% in Staten Island (to 452.9 per 1,000 
residents) and by 8.2% (to 217.2) elsewhere. The rate of 
high dose prescriptions decreased 8.2% (to 121.6 per 1,000 
residents) in Staten Island while increasing 4.7% (to 42.6) in 
the other four boroughs. The decrease in Staten Island rates of 
high dose prescriptions continued in the final quarter of 2013.
Discussion
After implementation of targeted and general public health 
initiatives, Staten Island saw 2 years of decreases in opioid 
analgesic high-dose prescribing and opioid analgesic–involved 
overdose mortality; the decreases followed 11 years of increases. 
In contrast, high-dose prescribing in the other four NYC 
boroughs increased without changes in opioid analgesic–
involved overdose mortality rates. In addition, the decreases 
in opioid analgesic overdoses on Staten Island were not offset 
by increases in heroin-involved overdose mortality.
FIGURE. Age-adjusted rate of unintentional drug poisoning (overdose) 
deaths involving opioid analgesics, by borough of residence, and New 
York City public health interventions — 2007–2013
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Source: New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner and New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2007–2013.
 * April 2011: Distributed a data brief citywide that highlighted overdose 
mortality and prescription use in Staten Island.
 † November 2011: Distributed opioid prescribing guidelines to all providers citywide.
 § May 2012: Ran first public service announcement campaign citywide.
 ¶ August 2012: State legislation passed mandating use of the prescription 
monitoring program.
 ** January 2013: Distributed opioid prescribing guidelines to emergency 
departments citywide.
 †† June 2013: Town halls convened in Staten Island by New York City 
commissioner of health and meeting held with Staten Island stakeholders. 
Implemented detailing campaign to promote opioid prescribing guidelines 
to prescribers in Staten Island.
 §§ August 2013: Statewide mandatory prescriber use of prescription monitoring 
program begun.
 ¶¶ December 2013: Ran second public service announcement campaign 
citywide with additional targeted airing in Staten Island.  
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Decreases in opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality 
have been reported from Wilkes County, North Carolina (7), 
Utah (8), Washington (9), and Florida (10). Each county or 
state employed a tailored strategy or combination of strategies 
to address opioid analgesic–involved overdose deaths, most of 
which included policy and clinical interventions. NYC employed 
both a general and geographically targeted approach, similar to 
Wilkes County, aiming to reach the entire NYC population and 
all prescribers, but found decreased mortality only in the targeted 
Staten Island area that received the most intensive interventions.
The findings in this report are subject to at least three 
limitations. First, although decreases were observed in both 
high-dose prescribing and opioid analgesic–involved mortality 
rates, it is not known whether decedents had taken prescribed 
or nonprescribed opioids, nor at what doses. Both decreases 
might be attributed to decreased risk for persons prescribed 
opioids or a decrease in the amount of opioids available for 
diversion to nonprescribed use. Second, law enforcement 
efforts to decrease the supply of diverted opioids or to reduce 
malpractice were not considered, although these efforts 
occurred during the period of the public health interventions. 
Finally, although the public health interventions were followed 
by a reduction in opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality 
rates in Staten Island, it is not possible to determine the extent 
of each intervention’s contribution to the decline.
Despite limitations, the fact that some of the initiatives were 
statewide or citywide (I-STOP, prescribing guidelines, and 
public service announcements), whereas others were Staten 
Island–specific (local media, local community engagement and 
conferences, tailored advertising messages, and office educational 
visits with prescribers) suggests that the community-specific 
initiatives might have been key to the decreases in Staten Island 
without corresponding decreases citywide. Staten Island’s size 
(500,000 pop.) and relative geographic separation from the other 
four NYC boroughs also might have enhanced its saturation with 
prevention messages and strategies. This tailored and intensive 
approach might be effective in other jurisdictions with high rates 
of opioid analgesic–involved mortality.
 1Bureau of Alcohol, Drug Use, Prevention, Care and Treatment, New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; 2Office of Noncommunicable 
Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health, National Center for Injury 
Prevention and Control, CDC; 3The Public Good Projects, New York City.
Corresponding author: Denise Paone, dpaone@health.nyc.gov, 347-396-7015.
TABLE 1. Number and rate per 100,000 residents* of unintentional drug poisoning (overdose) deaths involving any drug, heroin, or opioid 
analgesics,† by borough of residence§ — New York City, 2011–2013  
Borough of residence
2011 2012 2013
% rate change from 
2011 to 2013Total (Rate) Total (Rate) Total (Rate)
New York City
Any drug 567 (8.5) 660 (9.8) 672 (9.9) +16.4¶
Heroin 253 (3.8) 339 (5.0) 352 (5.2) +36.8¶
Opioid analgesics 201 (3.0) 181 (2.7) 197 (2.9) -3.3
Staten Island
Any drug 69 (18.4) 74 (19.9) 64 (17.6) -4.3¶
Heroin 22 (6.2) 36 (10.1) 32 (8.6) +38.7¶
Opioid analgesics 40 (10.7) 37 (10.0) 28 (7.6) -29.0¶
Other four boroughs
Any drugs 498 (7.9) 586 (9.3) 608 (9.5) +20.3¶
Heroin 231 (3.7) 303 (4.8) 320 (5.0) +35.1¶
Opioid analgesics 161 (2.6) 144 (2.3) 169 (2.6) 0.0
Source: Office of Chief Medical Examiner, New York City.
* Age-adjusted rates are calculated using intercensal estimates updated in December 2014, and are weighted to U.S. Census Standard 2000.
† The drug types are not mutually exclusive; most overdoses involved more than one substance.
§ Analysis limited to residents of Staten Island and the other four New York City boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens), based on data reported on death 
certificates.
¶ Statistically significant rate change (p<0.05), determined by z-tests and 95% confidence interval comparisons based on gamma confidence intervals distribution.  
What is known already?
Opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality is a serious 
public health issue. In New York City, the rate of opioid 
analgesic–involved overdose deaths increased 57% citywide, 
from 2005 to 2011. However, in one borough, Staten Island, the 
rate increased 257% during that period.
What is added by this report?
This report shows that data-driven, multi-pronged public health 
strategies, including judicious prescribing guidelines, office 
educational visits with providers, dissemination of timely data 
reports, and media campaigns, might contribute to a reduction 
in the rate of opioid analgesic–involved overdose deaths in 
Staten Island.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Targeted public health interventions appear effective in 
lowering opioid analgesic–involved overdose mortality rates; 
the interventions in Staten Island might be replicated by other 
health departments.  
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Foodborne illnesses represent a substantial, yet largely 
preventable, health burden in the United States. In 10 U.S. 
geographic areas, the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance 
Network* (FoodNet) monitors the incidence of laboratory-
confirmed infections caused by nine pathogens transmitted 
commonly through food. This report summarizes preliminary 
2014 data and describes changes in incidence compared with 
2006–2008 and 2011–2013. In 2014, FoodNet reported 
19,542 infections, 4,445 hospitalizations, and 71 deaths. 
The incidence of Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli 
(STEC) O157 and Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium 
infections declined in 2014 compared with 2006–2008, 
and the incidence of infection with Campylobacter, Vibrio, 
and Salmonella serotypes Infantis and Javiana was higher. 
Compared with 2011–2013, the incidence of STEC O157 
and Salmonella Typhimurium infections was lower, and the 
incidence of STEC non-O157 and Salmonella serotype Infantis 
infections was higher in 2014. Despite ongoing food safety 
efforts, the incidence of many infections remains high, indicat-
ing that further prevention measures are needed to make food 
safer and achieve national health objectives.
FoodNet conducts active, population-based surveillance 
for laboratory-confirmed infections caused by Campylobacter, 
Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Listeria, Salmonella, Shiga 
toxin–producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O157 and non-
O157, Shigella, Vibrio, and Yersinia in 10 geographic areas 
covering approximately 15% of the U.S. population (an 
estimated 48 million persons in 2013). FoodNet is a col-
laboration among CDC, 10 state health departments, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (USDA-FSIS), and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Hospitalizations occurring within 7 days of speci-
men collection are recorded, as is the patient’s vital status at 
hospital discharge or 7 days after specimen collection if the 
patient was not hospitalized. Hospitalizations and deaths that 
occur within 7 days of specimen collection are attributed to 
the infection. Surveillance for physician-diagnosed postdiar-
rheal hemolytic uremic syndrome, a complication of STEC 
infection characterized by renal failure, thrombocytopenia, and 
microangiopathic hemolytic anemia, is conducted through a 
network of nephrologists and infection preventionists and by 
hospital discharge data review. This report includes hemolytic 
uremic syndrome data for persons aged <18 years for 2013, 
the most recent year for which data are available.
Incidence was calculated by dividing the number of labora-
tory-confirmed infections in 2014 by U.S. Census estimates 
of the surveillance area population for 2013.† Incidence 
of culture-confirmed bacterial infections and laboratory-
confirmed parasitic infections (e.g., identified by enzyme 
immunoassay) are reported. A negative binomial model with 
95% confidence intervals (CIs) was used to estimate changes in 
incidence from 2006–2008 to 2014 and from 2011–2013 to 
2014. Change in the combined overall incidence of infection 
with six key foodborne pathogens§ was estimated. For STEC 
non-O157, because of changing diagnostic practices and test-
ing methods, only change in incidence since 2011–2013 was 
assessed; for Cyclospora, change was not assessed because data 
were sparse. For hemolytic uremic syndrome, 2013 incidence 
was compared with that in 2006–2008. The number of reports 
of positive culture-independent diagnostic tests without cor-
responding culture confirmation is reported for Campylobacter, 
Salmonella, Shigella, STEC, and Vibrio. Incidence calculations 
do not include culture-independent diagnostic test reports.
Cases of Infection, Incidence, and Trends
In 2014, FoodNet identified 19,542 cases of infection, 4,445 
hospitalizations, and 71 deaths (Table). The number and 
incidence per 100,000 population were as follows: Salmonella 
(7,452 [15.45]), Campylobacter (6,486 [13.45]), Shigella (2,801 
[5.81]), Cryptosporidium (1,175 [2.44]), STEC non-O157 
(690 [1.43]), STEC O157 (445 [0.92]), Vibrio (216 [0.45]), 
Yersinia (133 [0.28]), Listeria (118 [0.24]), and Cyclospora 
(26 [0.05]). The percentage of infections associated with 
outbreaks was as follows: STEC O157 (16%), Listeria (11%), 
STEC non-O157 (7%), Shigella (7%), Salmonella (6%), 
Preliminary Incidence and Trends of Infection with Pathogens Transmitted 
Commonly Through Food — Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, 
10 U.S. Sites, 2006–2014
Stacy M. Crim, MPH1, Patricia M. Griffin, MD1, Robert Tauxe, MD1, Ellyn P. Marder, MPH1,2, Debra Gilliss, MD3, Alicia B. Cronquist, MPH4, 
Matthew Cartter, MD5, Melissa Tobin-D’Angelo, MD6, David Blythe, MD7, Kirk Smith, DVM8, Sarah Lathrop, PhD9, Shelley Zansky, PhD10, Paul R. 
Cieslak, MD11, John Dunn, DVM12, Kristin G. Holt, DVM13, Beverly Wolpert, PhD14, Olga L. Henao, PhD1 (Author affiliations at end of text)
* Additional information available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet.
† Final incidence rates will be reported when population estimates for 2014 are 
available.
§ The overall incidence of infection combines data for Campylobacter, Listeria, 
Salmonella, STEC O157, Vibrio, and Yersinia, six key bacterial pathogens for 
which >50% of illnesses are estimated to be transmitted by food.
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Vibrio (6%), Cryptosporidium (5%), Yersinia (0.8%), and 
Campylobacter (0.6%).
Among 6,565 (88%) serotyped Salmonella isolates in 2014, 
the number and incidence per 100,000 population of the 
top six serotypes were as follows: Enteritidis (1,401 [2.90]), 
Typhimurium (806 [1.67]), Newport (724 [1.50]), Javiana 
(639 [1.32]), I 4,[5],12:i:- (381 [0.79]), and Infantis (235 
[0.49]). Among 208 (96%) speciated Vibrio isolates, 131 
(63%) were V. parahaemolyticus, 27 (13%) were V. alginolyticus, 
and 19 (9%) were V. vulnificus. Among 546 (79%) serogrouped 
STEC non-O157 isolates, the top serogroups were O26 (31%), 
O103 (24%), and O111 (19%).
Compared with 2006–2008, the 2014 incidence was signifi-
cantly lower for STEC O157 (32% decrease; CI = 18%–43%) 
and Yersinia (22% decrease; CI = 1%–39%) infections, higher 
for Vibrio (52% increase; CI = 22%–89%) and Campylobacter 
(13% increase; CI = 5%–21%) infections, and not significantly 
changed for other pathogens (Figure 1). Among the six most 
commonly identified Salmonella serotypes, the incidence was 
significantly lower in 2014 for Typhimurium (27% decrease; 
CI = 18%–35%) compared with 2006–2008, but significantly 
higher for Infantis (162% increase; CI = 100%–244%) and 
Javiana (131% increase; CI = 83%–191%). Incidence for the 
three serotypes with significant changes in 2014 was calculated 
for the period 2006–2014 (Figure 2). Compared with 2011–
2013, the 2014 incidence was significantly lower for STEC 
O157 and Salmonella serotype Typhimurium infections and 
higher for STEC non-O157 and Salmonella serotype Infantis 
infections. The overall incidence of infection with the six key 
foodborne pathogens was not significantly different from either 
of the comparison periods.
In 2013, a total of 87 cases of postdiarrheal hemolytic uremic 
syndrome were reported among children aged <18 years (0.79 
cases per 100,000). Of these, 46 (53%) occurred in children aged 
<5 years (1.55 cases per 100,000). The incidence of hemolytic 
uremic syndrome was not significantly different than during 
2006–2008 for either age group. No deaths were reported.
In addition to culture-confirmed infections (some with 
positive culture-independent diagnostic test results), there 
were 1,597 reports of positive culture-independent diagnostic 
tests that were not confirmed by culture, either because a cul-
ture did not yield the pathogen or because the specimen was 
not cultured. These reports were not included in the overall 
count of cases. Among 1,070 Campylobacter reports in this 
category, 553 (52%) had no culture, and 517 (48%) were 
culture-negative. Among 146 STEC reports, 62 (42%) had 
no culture, and 84 (58%) were culture-negative. The Shiga 
toxin–positive result was confirmed for 65 (48%) of 135 
broths sent to a public health laboratory. The other reports of 
positive culture-independent diagnostic tests where culture was 
negative or not performed were of Salmonella (193), Shigella 
(186), and Vibrio (two).
Discussion
In 2014, the incidence of laboratory-confirmed Shiga 
toxin–producing E. coli O157 and Salmonella serotype 
Typhimurium infections was significantly lower than during 
2006–2008, whereas the incidence of Campylobacter, Vibrio, 
and Salmonella serotypes Javiana and Infantis infections was 
higher. Compared with 2011–2013, incidence of STEC 
non-O157 and Salmonella serotype Infantis infection was 
significantly higher.
TABLE. Number of cases of culture-confirmed bacterial and laboratory-confirmed parasitic infection, hospitalizations, and deaths, by pathogen 
— Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, United States, 2014*
Pathogen
Cases Hospitalizations Deaths
No. Incidence† Objective§ No. (%) No. (%)
Bacteria
Campylobacter 6,486 13.45 8.5 1,080 (17) 11 (0.2)
Listeria 118 0.24 0.2 108 (92) 18 (15.3)
Salmonella 7,452 15.45 11.4 2,141 (29) 30 (0.4)
Shigella 2,801 5.81 N/A¶ 569 (20) 2 (0.1)
STEC O157 445 0.92 0.6 154 (35) 3 (0.7)
STEC non-O157 690 1.43 N/A 104 (15) 0 (0.0)
Vibrio 216 0.45 0.2 40 (19) 2 (0.9)
Yersinia 133 0.28 0.3 30 (23) 1 (0.8)
Parasites
Cryptosporidium 1,175 2.44 N/A 217 (18) 4 (0.3)
Cyclospora 26 0.05 N/A 2 (8) 0 (0.0)
Total 19,542 4,445 71
Abbreviations: N/A = not available; STEC = Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli.
* Data for 2014 are preliminary.
†  Per 100,000 population.
§  Healthy People 2020 objective targets for incidence of Campylobacter, Listeria, Salmonella, STEC O157, Vibrio, and Yersinia infections per 100,000 population.
¶ No national health objective exists for these pathogens.
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The decrease in the incidence of STEC O157 infections 
could be attributable to several factors related to food safety 
efforts. Today, because isolates are routinely sent to public 
health departments for subtyping by PulseNet,¶ and epidemi-
ologists rapidly investigate clusters of illnesses in which bacteria 
have similar DNA fingerprints, the sources of outbreaks are 
identified faster than in the past, which allows contaminated 
products to be removed from the marketplace before more 
persons become ill. The most common sources of STEC O157 
infection are beef and leafy vegetables (1). After STEC O157 
was declared an adulterant in ground beef in 1994, public 
health officials identified many STEC O157 outbreaks that 
resulted in ground beef recalls. Substantial changes in beef 
industry practices and government policy** led to a decrease 
in ground beef contamination (2). Contamination of ground 
beef with STEC O157 has decreased.†† Producers of leafy 
vegetables have also made improvements after a large outbreak 
in 2006 (3). It is also possible that a portion of the decrease is 
related to the increasing use of culture-independent diagnostic 
tests without confirmatory culture.
The increasing incidence of non-O157 STEC infections 
is attributable, in part, to an increase in the number of labo-
ratories testing for Shiga toxin and, consequently, increased 
recognition of non-O157 STEC infections (4). Six serogroups 
(O26, O45, O103, O111, O121, and O145) are considered 
adulterants in non-intact beef products or the components of 
these products. In 2012, USDA-FSIS began testing for non-
O157 STEC in domestic and imported beef manufacturing 
trimmings.§§
Salmonella serotypes are diverse in reservoirs and sources. The 
unchanged overall incidence of salmonellosis masks substantial 
changes in infection with individual serotypes. Typhimurium, 
the most common serotype reported to FoodNet until 2009, 
has contaminated a wide variety of food sources, including 
cattle and poultry. The incidence of Typhimurium infections 
nationwide has been declining since the mid-1980s, for reasons 
that are unclear (5). An analysis of outbreak data from 1998 
to 2008 estimated that 34% of Typhimurium infections were 
related to consumption of poultry (1). Decreases in contamina-
tion of whole chickens with Salmonella serotype Typhimurium, 
as reported by USDA-FSIS¶¶ (Kristin Holt, USDA-FSIS; 
personal communication, 2013–2014 data, 2015), might 
have contributed to the decline. In July 2011, USDA-FSIS 
tightened the performance standards for Salmonella on poul-
try carcasses, and, in December 2013, released an action plan 
to decrease contamination in regulated products.*** Poultry 
vaccines against Salmonella have been used increasingly, first 
FIGURE 1. Relative rates of culture-confirmed infections with 
Campylobacter, STEC* O157, Listeria, Salmonella, and Vibrio 
compared with 2006–2008 rates, by year — Foodborne Diseases 
Active Surveillance Network, United States, 2006–2014†
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* Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli.
† The position of each line indicates the relative change in the incidence of that 
pathogen compared with 2006–2008. The actual incidences of these infections 
cannot be determined from this figure.  
FIGURE 2. Incidence per 100,000 population of culture-confirmed 
infection with Salmonella serotypes Typhimurium, Javiana, and 
Infantis, by year — Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, 
United States, 2006–2014
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¶ PulseNet is the national molecular subtyping network for foodborne bacterial 
pathogens.
 ** The Federal Register notice is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/
ed6d4959-a499-4e6e-af86-ae8a419ba156/00-022N.htm?MOD=AJPERES.
 †† Data on ground beef contamination by year are available at http://www.fsis.
usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/data-collection-and-reports/microbiology/
ec/positive-results-current-cy/positive-results-current-cy.
 §§ More information is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/frame-
redirect?url=http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/2010-
0023FRN.htm.
 ¶¶ FSIS serotype report through 2012 available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/
wps/wcm/connect/180fc804-0311-4b4d-ae42-d735e8232e1c/Salmonella-
Serotype-Annual-2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
 *** More information is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/
aae911af-f918-4fe1-bc42-7b957b2e942a/SAP-120413.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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in egg-laying flocks, and to a lesser extent in broiler breeder 
flocks.††† Salmonella serotype Javiana infection is concentrated 
in southeastern states; the number of counties with annual 
infection rates above one case per 100,000 both inside and out-
side the southeast has increased markedly since the 1990s (5).
Additional regulations and ongoing industry efforts are 
likely to improve food safety. In January 2015, USDA-FSIS 
proposed new pathogen-reduction performance standards for 
Salmonella and Campylobacter in comminuted (reduced to 
minute particles) chicken and turkey products as well as raw 
chicken parts, such as chicken breasts, thighs, and wings.§§§ 
In 2015, FDA plans to publish regulations for safer produce, 
processed foods, and imported foods, as mandated by the Food 
Safety Modernization Act (6). Vaccination of breeder poultry 
flocks, in combination with biosecurity measures, has been 
shown to reduce contamination of poultry meat (7).
The findings in this report are subject to at least four 
limitations. First, increasing use of culture-independent tests 
by clinical laboratories might affect the number of culture-
confirmed infections reported; culture-independent testing 
might increase (as observed for STEC non-O157 infections) 
or decrease (because fewer cases might be diagnosed through 
traditional methods) reported incidence (8). Second, health 
care–seeking behaviors and other characteristics of the popula-
tion in the surveillance area might affect the generalizability 
of the findings. Third, the proportion of illnesses transmitted 
by nonfood routes differs by pathogen; data provided in this 
report are not limited to infections from food. Finally, changes 
in incidence between periods can reflect year-to-year variation 
during those periods rather than sustained trends, and the 
number of infections and patterns observed might change as 
final data become available.
Progress has been made in decreasing contamination of 
some foods and reducing illness caused by some pathogens. 
However, little or no recent reductions for most infections 
have occurred. For example, Campylobacter and Vibrio rates are 
still higher than during 2006–2008, a pattern also observed in 
2013 (9). More information is needed to understand sources 
of infection and changes in incidence, and to help determine 
where to target prevention efforts.
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What is already known on this topic?
The incidence of many foodborne infections, including 
Salmonella, has been largely unchanged for many years. 
Salmonella infection is a complicated problem because infection 
can be acquired by many types of foods and from nonfood 
sources, so many different control methods are needed.
What is added by this report?
The 2014 data show progress in reducing infections from 
Escherichia coli O157 and Salmonella serotype Typhimurium. 
However, the incidence of infection with Salmonella serotypes 
Infantis and Javiana has increased.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Infections caused by E. coli serogroup O157 declined after 
targeted interventions to reduce contamination of ground beef 
were implemented. Similarly, to reduce the incidence of 
Salmonella infection, serotype-specific approaches are required. 
Public health, regulatory agencies, industry, and consumers can 
all play a role.
 ††† More information is available at https://www.avma.org/News/JAVMANews/
Pages/101215x.aspx.
 §§§ The Federal Register notice is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/
wcm/connect/b711839a-c0b9-420f-9d74-8568310a1352/2014-0023.
htm?MOD=AJPERES.  
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As one of the three West African countries highly affected by 
the 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic, Liberia 
reported approximately 10,000 cases (1). The Ebola epidemic 
in Liberia was marked by intense urban transmission, multiple 
community outbreaks with source cases occurring in patients 
coming from the urban areas, and outbreaks in health care 
facilities (HCFs) (2,3). This report, based on data from rou-
tine case investigations and contact tracing, describes efforts 
to stop the last known chain of Ebola transmission in Liberia. 
The index patient became ill on December 29, 2014, and the 
last of 21 associated cases was in a patient admitted into an 
Ebola treatment unit (ETU) on February 18, 2015. The chain 
of transmission was stopped because of early detection of new 
cases; identification, monitoring, and support of contacts in 
acceptable settings; effective triage within the health care sys-
tem; and rapid isolation of symptomatic contacts. In addition, 
a “sector” approach, which divided Montserrado County into 
geographic units, facilitated the ability of response teams to 
rapidly respond to community needs. In the final stages of the 
outbreak, intensive coordination among partners and engage-
ment of community leaders were needed to stop transmission 
in densely populated Montserrado County. A companion 
report describes the efforts to enhance infection prevention 
and control efforts in HCFs (4). After February 19, no addi-
tional clusters of Ebola cases have been detected in Liberia.* 
On May 9, the World Health Organization declared the end 
of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.
Evolution of the Cluster
The index patient in this cluster was a woman aged 50 years 
who became ill on December 29, 2014, in a community near 
St. Paul River Bridge in Montserrado County (Monrovia). 
After seeking care from an herbalist in her community, the 
patient presented to an HCF on January 4 with high fever, red 
eyes, and cough. Ebola was suspected, but she refused referral 
to an ETU and was sent home with antibiotics and antipyret-
ics. On January 5, she was admitted to an ETU and died later 
that day. A postmortem swab of oral fluids tested positive for 
Ebola virus by polymerase chain reaction. Her family reported 
no known contact with other Ebola patients, although other 
Ebola cases had been reported in the same neighborhood. 
In addition, before her illness, the woman had traveled to 
Grand Cape Mount County, where Ebola virus transmission 
was ongoing.
Over the following 7 weeks, 21 additional persons with 
laboratory-confirmed Ebola were linked to this case: 11 family 
members, six neighbors, two community members, one health 
care worker, and an herbalist (Figure 1). These cases occurred 
in three generations, all epidemiologically linked to the index 
case. The time interval from onset of illness to admission 
to an ETU decreased with each generation of cases. Twenty 
patients (including the index patient) received treatment at 
an ETU, including 13 patients who died. The two associated 
Ebola-infected persons who did not seek care in an ETU died 
in the community. Five first-generation patients were admit-
ted to an ETU on average 6.0 days (range = 2–11 days) after 
illness onset. Ten second-generation patients averaged 4.7 days 
(range = 1–11 days) from symptom onset to ETU admission 
or death in the community. The six third-generation patients 
averaged 1.5 days (range = 0–4 days) from symptom onset to 
ETU admission (Table). The case-fatality rates among the suc-
cessive generations were 100%, 60%, and 50%, respectively. 
Probable transmission for 18 of the cases (86%) occurred 
within 1 kilometer of St. Paul River Bridge in Montserrado 
County, whereas transmission for three cases occurred near 
Red Light, 15 kilometers southeast of St. Paul River Bridge 
(Figure 2).
Five patients worked in an HCF, three as cleaners (1A, 
2C, and 3D) and two as health care providers (3A and 3C). 
However, the cleaners and one health care provider (3A) had 
significant household exposures with persons with confirmed 
Ebola that could account for their infection (Figure 1). One 
patient (1B) traveled to Red Light while symptomatic, became 
incapacitated in the community, and exposed two persons 
(2E and 2I) who assisted him into a taxi. One of these men 
later exposed patient 3C, a health care provider working in 
Red Light.
According to information provided by patients or their fam-
ily during case investigations, several symptomatic patients 
sought care in counties outside of Montserrado to conceal * Another single case occurred in a person who received a diagnosis of Ebola on 
March 20, 2015, and was not connected to this cluster (5).  
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their illness or obtain more affordable medical care. Patient 
2A traveled from Montserrado to Bomi County to seek care at 
an ETU; 2G traveled to Bomi County to access an affordable 
appendectomy, but was turned back at a county checkpoint; 
2H traveled from Montserrado to Lofa County and was 
transported by ambulance to an ETU in Bomi; and 2D, to 
avoid detection, traveled to Margibi County under a differ-
ent name, sought care twice from a non-ETU HCF, and died 
there in the community (Figure 1). His wife (3E) resided in 
Margibi County and became infected while caring for him. 
At least eight patients sought care at non-ETU HCFs before 
their Ebola diagnosis in nine facilities in Montserrado County 
and one in Margibi County, exposing a total of 166 health 
care workers (4).
In several instances, challenges with HCF triage contributed 
to missing patients with suspect or probable Ebola. One patient 
FIGURE 1. Transmission diagram for the last known cluster of Ebola virus disease cases (N = 22) — Liberia, December 29, 2014–March 5, 2015*
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TABLE. Characteristics of patients with Ebola virus disease (Ebola) in 
the last known cluster of Ebola (N = 22*), by transmission generation 
— Liberia, January–February 2015
Characteristic
Transmission generation
Total  
(N = 22)*
1st  
(n = 5)
2nd  
(n = 10)
3rd  
(n = 6)
Average age (yrs) (range) 36 
(10–60)
32 
(10–60)
34 
(13–55)
41  
(24–58)
Average no. of symptomatic days in 
the community (range)
4.2  
(0–11)
6  
(2–11)
4.7 (1–11) 1.5  
(0–4)
Female 12 2 5 4
Survived 7 0 4 3
Transmission location
Montserrado County, Sector 2 18 5 8 4
Montserrado County, Sector 4 3 0 2 1
Margibi County 1 0 0 1
Initially listed as contact 15 3 6 6
Visited non-ETU while symptomatic 8 2 4 1
Abbreviation: ETU = Ebola treatment unit.
* Includes index patient.
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(1A) tested positive for malaria and was sent home from an 
HCF. One initially afebrile patient (2G), with clinical symptoms 
consistent with appendicitis or pelvic inflammatory disease, 
received care at two clinics and was hospitalized at a third facility 
for 7 days before being transferred to an ETU. A symptomatic, 
high-risk contact (3C) under daily monitoring, presented for 
care at an ETU but was sent home despite a history of exposure 
to body fluids of a confirmed Ebola patient because his tem-
perature was <100.4°F (<38.0°C). Two days later, he presented 
with symptoms at the non-ETU HCF where he worked and 
was sent to an ETU, where Ebola was confirmed.
Contact tracing identified 745 contacts for this cluster over 
the 6-week period, including the 166 health care workers from 
10 HCFs (4). During the response to this cluster, considerable 
efforts were made to address the needs of high-risk contacts 
(e.g., those with documented exposure to body fluids of persons 
with confirmed Ebola). In some instances, contacts agreed 
to home-based quarantine, and groups of contacts agreed 
to facility-based observation (i.e., direct daily symptom and 
temperature monitoring in an HCF), where they could be 
immediately isolated if symptoms developed, without risk of 
community transmission. Incomplete contact tracing contrib-
uted to the persistence of this cluster; only 15 (68%) of the 
cases were in persons listed as known contacts; 60% of first- and 
second-generation and 100% of third-generation cases were 
in persons who were known contacts (Table). Several patients 
in the cluster denied Ebola symptoms or exposure to persons 
with confirmed Ebola when seeking care, reportedly because 
FIGURE 2. Ebola virus disease (Ebola) cases (N = 21) in the last known cluster of Ebola, by location and transmission generation — Montserrado 
County,* Liberia, January–February 2015
* N = 21 for Montserrado County; one other case in this cluster of 22 cases occurred in Margibi County.
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of fear of community stigma and apprehension of ETUs. At 
least one child (1D) was hidden from contact tracers when they 
visited. Persons who initially presented to non-ETU HCFs 
were less likely to be listed as contacts; two (25%) of eight 
persons who initially presented to non-ETUs were known 
contacts, compared with 13 (93%) of 14 who first presented 
for care at an ETU. Although guidance called for immediate 
isolation of symptomatic contacts, nine (75%) known contacts 
were isolated ≥2 days after symptom onset. The last confirmed 
case in this cluster (3F) was in a person admitted to an ETU 
on February 18 and discharged on March 5. The last cluster-
associated contacts who did not become ill exited monitoring 
on March 11.
Discussion
This network of Ebola transmission in Liberia illustrated 
numerous challenges that persisted throughout the epidemic: 
fear of stigmatization in the community, delays in seeking treat-
ment, inadequate triage in HCFs, lack of recognition of Ebola 
cases, and incomplete identification and follow-up of some 
contacts. The motivations for denying Ebola symptoms and 
resisting treatment are complex, but include stigma, fear, and 
denial related to possible Ebola infection, mistrust of ETUs, 
and low medical literacy. Despite the widespread availability 
of ETUs in Montserrado County, some persons opted for care 
at distant ETUs or care in non-ETU settings, where, conse-
quently, large numbers of health care workers were exposed. 
Delayed treatment might have contributed to worse outcomes 
in the first two transmission generations compared with the 
last generation, when patients sought care more promptly. 
Triage systems did not fully prevent Ebola patients from being 
admitted to HCFs rather than ETUs. Despite these challenges, 
the last cluster of Ebola in Liberia was controlled because of 
successful implementation of known effective Ebola control 
strategies, including early detection of new cases; identifica-
tion, daily monitoring, and support of contacts in acceptable 
settings; effective triage within the health care system; and 
rapid isolation of symptomatic contacts (2,3).
To improve case investigations and contact tracing, 
Montserrado County had coincidentally decentralized man-
agement of outbreak activities in the four geographic sectors. 
This decentralized, “sector” approach might have reduced the 
risk for community transmission. Each geographic sector had 
multidisciplinary teams led by coordinators located in each 
sector to manage and coordinate outbreak response activities 
at the sector, zone, and block level. Sector teams were empow-
ered to make decisions related to control activities locally, and 
this enabled flexible adaptation of accepted outbreak control 
principles to fit local circumstances. Strategies included the use 
of home-based and community quarantine and facility-based 
observation, with provision of basic needs and psychosocial 
support, active case-finding, and outreach to religious and 
community leaders to allay the fears of affected households 
and community members. Although decentralization of sector 
management presented initial communication and coordina-
tion challenges, the enhanced sector-based efforts resulted 
in more complete contact tracing, more prompt isolation of 
symptomatic patients in the second and third generations of 
transmission, increased survival, and reduced transmission in 
the community.
As the threat of Ebola wanes, much needed non-Ebola 
health services are resuming in Liberia. However, comprehen-
sive triage for Ebola (3) and appropriate personal protective 
equipment are crucial but cannot completely eliminate risk for 
Ebola transmission at HCFs. At least eight cases in the cluster 
described in this report were in patients who sought care at 
non-ETU HCFs; six (75%) of these were not listed as contacts, 
highlighting the critical importance of comprehensive contact 
tracing. These eight patients were treated by HCFs despite the 
universal requirement of triage. At least four patients in this 
cluster did not have fever when presenting for care; some HCFs 
and contact tracers used lack of fever as a de facto indicator to 
rule out Ebola (i.e., rather than completing a comprehensive 
triage), highlighting the limitations of temperature-based 
triage. Conversely, many non-Ebola patients had illnesses 
that met the case definition but could not be tested without 
transfer to an ETU, where care for their non-Ebola medical 
conditions would not be offered. Despite these challenges, only 
one of the exposed health care workers in this cluster became 
infected with Ebola, and no additional transmission occurred 
What is already known on this topic?
During the initial phases of the 2014-2015 Ebola virus disease 
(Ebola) epidemic in Liberia, there was intense urban transmis-
sion, multiple community outbreaks with source cases occur-
ring in patients coming from the urban areas, and outbreaks in 
health care facilities.
What is added by this report?
The last cluster of Ebola in Liberia included 22 cases, with three 
generations of transmission. Through enhanced control efforts, 
patients in successive generations were admitted to Ebola 
treatment units more quickly, mortality decreased, and 
community transmission was interrupted.
What are the implications for public health practice?
The last chain of transmission was controlled because of 
successful implementation of known strategies to control Ebola, 
including early detection of new cases; identification, monitor-
ing, and support of contacts in acceptable settings; effective 
triage within the health care system; and rapid isolation of 
symptomatic contacts.  
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in HCFs, possibly because of timely, targeted infection preven-
tion and control training and provision of personal protective 
equipment (4). Additionally, the most recent Ebola patient 
was appropriately triaged to an ETU when she presented to a 
non-ETU HCF (5).
In contrast to earlier in the Ebola epidemic, sector-based inten-
sified contact tracing and in-depth case investigation, widespread 
infection prevention and control efforts (3), and coordination 
of case investigation and contact tracing activities between 
Montserrado and other counties (6) were key to stopping this 
final chain of Ebola transmission. The risk for re-introduction of 
Ebola into Liberia will remain high as long as transmission con-
tinues in the region. National efforts to strengthen surveillance, 
alert and response, border screening, and triage and infection 
prevention and control in HCFs are high-priority activities in 
the government of Liberia’s recovery plan.
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Overall, 166 non-Ebola treatment unit health care work-
ers in 10 HCFs possibly were exposed to the eight Ebola 
patients (Figure). The nature of their possible exposures 
varied, including providing treatment or performing labora-
tory tests on blood specimens of Ebola patients, or cleaning 
a room or mattress where an Ebola patient had slept. All 166 
were placed on contact lists. Of these, 86 (52%) were placed 
under home-based quarantine or precautionary observation at 
an HCF because of relatively higher risk exposures, while the 
remainder were monitored by contact tracers, either at home 
or at their place of employment (Figure). One clinic was closed 
entirely (clinic D) (Figure) during the postexposure period of 
observation, and one inpatient section of a hospital was closed 
(hospital D) (Figure). One health care worker developed Ebola 
after debriding and suturing the lacerations of an Ebola patient 
who had sought care for treatment of injuries sustained in a 
fight, and both the patient and the health care worker died. 
None of the other 165 health care workers developed Ebola.
Observations of the 10 HCFs found that health care worker 
exposures could have occurred for multiple reasons. Triage 
systems were inadequate with limited or no triage or isolation 
structures, no use or inappropriate use of infrared thermom-
eters, limited ability to elicit accurate contact exposure his-
tory, and an incomplete understanding of the case definition 
(suspected or probable) by some staff members. Additional 
challenges included no use or inappropriate use of personal 
protective equipment, insufficient staff to support IPC activi-
ties, and inconsistent oversight by IPC partners.
Ring IPC Strategy
Ring IPC was a collaboration of the Liberian Ministry of 
Health National and Montserrado Incident Management 
Systems, Montserrado and Margibi county health teams, CDC, 
WHO, the African Union, and nongovernmental organization 
partners under the Liberia IPC Task Force. On January 30, 
members of the IPC Task Force met to formalize components 
of the Ring IPC approach, including identification of target 
HCFs, a focus on triage, involvement of external staff members 
to support triage, and coordination and definition of roles 
among partners. The purpose of Ring IPC was to provide 
intensive IPC support (3,4) to HCFs in areas of active Ebola 
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From mid-January to mid-February 2015, all confirmed Ebola 
virus disease (Ebola) cases that occurred in Liberia were epide-
miologically linked to a single index patient from the St. Paul 
Bridge area of Montserrado County (1). Of the 22 confirmed 
patients in this cluster, eight (36%) sought and received care from 
at least one of 10 non-Ebola health care facilities (HCFs), includ-
ing clinics and hospitals in Montserrado and Margibi counties, 
before admission to an Ebola treatment unit. After recognition 
that three patients in this emerging cluster had received care 
from a non-Ebola treatment unit, and in response to the risk 
for Ebola transmission in non-Ebola treatment unit health care 
settings (2), a focused infection prevention and control (IPC) 
rapid response effort for the immediate area was developed to 
target facilities at increased risk for exposure to a person with 
Ebola (Ring IPC). The Ring IPC approach, which provided 
rapid, intensive, and short-term IPC support to HCFs in areas of 
active Ebola transmission, was an addition to Liberia’s proposed 
longer term national IPC strategy, which focused on providing a 
comprehensive package of IPC training and support to all HCFs 
in the country. This report describes possible health care worker 
exposures to the cluster’s eight patients who sought care from 
an HCF and implementation of the Ring IPC approach. On 
May 9, 2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
the end of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia.*
St. Paul Bridge Cluster
The eight Ebola patients who sought care from an HCF 
ranged in age from 10 to 56 years; three were female. Only 
two of the eight were on a contact tracing list of persons with 
known prior Ebola exposure when they went to the HCF. Two 
patients died in the community and were never admitted to 
an Ebola treatment unit. For the other six, a median of 1 day 
passed (range = 0–9 days) between the first visit to an HCF 
and their admission to an Ebola treatment unit. For three 
patients with available data, a fever (defined as a temperature 
>100.4°F [>38°C] taken with an infrared thermometer) was 
not recorded on arrival at the HCF. Of the eight patients, seven 
subsequently died from Ebola.
* Additional information available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
statements/2015/liberia-ends-ebola/en/. 
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FIGURE. Health care workers (HCWs) with exposure to eight Ebola patients at non-Ebola treatment units and targeted infection prevention 
and control (Ring IPC) initiation — Montserrado and Margibi counties, Liberia, January–February 2015  
Montserrado County 
Margibi County 
IN Clinic A
11 HCWs
Jan 4
Hospital A
8 HCWs, 
4 under home-based
quarantine 
Jan 17
1D
Clinic B 
13 HCWs*
Jan 17–19
Ring no. 1 
(Jan 23) 
18 clinics 1A
Feb 3–4
27 HCWs,  
all under voluntary 
observation
at health care facility  
2E Clinic D
5 HCWs
Jan 30–31
Ring no. 2
(Feb 3) 
4 clinics, 2 health  
centers, 1 hospital
2D Clinic C 
2I
Jan 30–31
6 HCWs,  
all under home-based
quarantine
6 HCWs, 
4 under voluntary observation 
at health care facility; 
2 under home-based
quarantine
Jan 30 
Feb 13
40 HCWs, 
3 under home-based
quarantine§
Ring no. 3
(Feb 6)
28 clinics,  
2 health centers,  
1 hospital
3C  
1 HCW†
Clinic E Hospital B
Hospital B
2G
7 HCWs,
4 under home-based
quarantine
33 HCWs, 
31 under voluntary 
observation 
at health care facility, 
2 in US
Jan 29
8 HCWs,
3 under home-based
quarantine
Feb 1
Feb 1–7
5 HCWs,
all under home-based
quarantine
Feb 7
Ring no. 4
(Feb 9)
1 clinic,  
2 hospitals
Clinic F
Hospital C
Hospital D
Ambulance team 
Abbreviations: IN = index patient for St. Paul Bridge cluster; 1A and 1D = other patients identified as first generation of cluster; 2D, 2E, 2G, and 2I = patients identified 
as second generation; 3C = patients identified as third generation.
* A sister of patient 1A who worked at Clinic B was exposed in her role as family caregiver.
† 3C, one of the 2 HCWs under quarantine at home, sought care at his place of employment while symptomatic.  
§ The home-based quarantine period was extended for 3 patients previously under home-based quarantine from exposure to 3C.   
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transmission, thus forming a strategically placed protective 
ring of intensified IPC attention around persons with known 
Ebola to help break the chain of transmission. This strategy 
entailed selecting target HCFs for Ring IPC intervention based 
on known health care worker exposure to an Ebola patient, 
neighboring HCFs around the HCF that treated a patient, 
or HCFs in close proximity to the residence of a patient with 
confirmed Ebola. Next, rapid IPC needs assessments were 
conducted at these HCFs using Ministry of Health and Social 
Work (MOHSW) approved assessment tools (5). These assess-
ments focused on triage procedures and personal protective 
equipment use, and found inadequate or absent triage and 
isolation structures, gaps in the personal protective equipment 
supply chain, and a need for general IPC training in addition 
to specialized triage training.
Training and Equipment
Identified challenges were addressed by the national IPC 
Task Force developing training that targeted key personnel. 
Triage training, based on existing MOHSW-approved IPC 
training materials, was developed and provided to 47 African 
Union clinicians. These clinicians were deployed to 36 target 
HCFs in Monteserrado County to provide onsite daily triage 
mentoring and support for the duration of the high-risk expo-
sure monitoring period, or for at least 2 weeks. Three nurses, 
previously employed by an Ebola treatment unit, provided 
similar triage support for one hospital. In addition, three 
1-day triage training sessions were provided for more than 
125 staff members working in three target HCFs. In Margibi 
County, a 1-day triage training session was conducted for 
11 staff members working in five target HCFs, and African 
Union staff and nurses or other county health staff members 
provided ongoing triage mentoring and IPC support to seven 
target HCFs. This intensive IPC approach served to alert health 
care workers to recent Ebola virus transmission in their com-
munities, identify additional contacts at HCFs where Ebola 
virus exposure had occurred, and provide a secondary source 
(in addition to contact tracing) of information on the health 
status of exposed health care workers.
In response to heightened awareness of clinic needs, partners 
provided personal protective equipment and other essential IPC 
supplies to target facilities. Ring IPC partners in Montserrado 
County and the national IPC Task Force initiated an emergency 
release of a 1-month supply of personal protective equipment to 
priority clinics. Nongovernmental organization partners assessed 
and constructed triage structures when needed.
Initiation of Rings
During January 23–February 9, in response to the ongoing 
St. Paul Bridge cluster, four IPC rings were initiated in Liberia, 
three in Montserrado County and one in Margibi County 
(Figure). The first ring was initiated 4 days after recognition 
that a facility had provided care to an Ebola patient; subsequent 
rings were initiated within 2 days after recognition of other 
Ebola patients. In total, 59 target HCFs were identified, 52 in 
Montserrado County (out of a total of 294 HCFs) and seven 
(out of a total of 32) in Margibi County. There was an average 
of 15 HCFs per ring (range = 3–31).
Overall, Ring IPC efforts appeared to be associated with 
an increase in the identification and isolation of suspected or 
probable Ebola patients. For example, three probable Ebola 
patients were identified through triage during training con-
ducted at one target HCF in Montserrado County. Only one 
of the 166 exposed health care workers in the St. Paul Bridge 
cluster became infected with Ebola. This low prevalence of 
secondary infection among health care workers suggests that 
basic infection prevention principles were being observed by 
health care workers during this period. Nevertheless, triage was 
not always completely successful; the one health care worker 
who became infected with Ebola after Ring IPC activities were 
initiated actually sought care at his place of employment, an 
identified target HCF, and was permitted to enter without first 
being properly triaged as a probable or suspect Ebola patient.
What is already known on this topic?
The adoption of essential infection prevention and control (IPC) 
practices among health care workers, such as hand washing 
and proper use of personal protective equipment, is crucial to 
interrupting the transmission of Ebola.
What is added by this report?
From mid-January to mid-February 2015, all confirmed Ebola 
cases in Liberia were epidemiologically linked to a single index 
patient. Of the 22 confirmed patients in this cluster, eight (36%) 
sought and received care from at least one of 10 non-Ebola 
health care facilities. During this time, a focused IPC response 
effort, termed Ring IPC, was developed collaboratively to target 
health care facilities at increased risk for exposure to a person 
with Ebola. Rapid, intensive, and short-term IPC support was 
provided at these health care facilities following rapid needs 
assessments focused on triage procedures and personal 
protective equipment use.
What are the implications for public health practice?
The implementation of Ring IPC in Liberia might offer a useful 
model for rapid response to Ebola virus transmission and health 
care worker exposure in other settings. A comprehensive 
strategy remains critical to raising the level of IPC capacity 
nationwide; however, an appropriately targeted Ring IPC 
approach might be an effective supplemental strategy to focus 
IPC support in response to clusters of disease.  
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
508 MMWR / May 15, 2015 / Vol. 64 / No. 18
Discussion
Included among the Ebola response efforts in Liberia was 
the creation in early September 2014 of a national IPC Task 
Force to support the MOHSW. The IPC Task Force served 
as a coordinating body to facilitate IPC planning and imple-
mentation of activities in both health care and non–health care 
facilities, as well as providing IPC guidance and technical assis-
tance through policy development and standardization of IPC 
training and implementation tools consistent with MOHSW 
priorities. The national IPC strategy had focused on providing 
a comprehensive package of IPC training and support, through 
trained IPC specialists, at major health facilities throughout the 
country because of widespread Ebola transmission occurring 
at the time. This strategy includes promoting essential IPC 
practices among health care workers, such as hand washing 
and proper use of personal protective equipment. Although a 
comprehensive strategy remains critical to raising the level of 
IPC capacity nationwide, an appropriately targeted Ring IPC 
approach might be an effective supplemental strategy to focus 
IPC support in response to clusters of disease.
The public health intervention described in this report was 
rapidly implemented and integrated into Liberia’s national 
Ebola response as a result of coordinated, collaborative efforts by 
multiple partners. Coordination and collaboration among the 
national Incident Management System, county health teams, 
CDC, WHO, African Union and nongovernmental organization 
partners was key to identifying gaps in IPC needs and preventing 
duplication of efforts. The initial ring was coordinated by the 
IPC Task Force under MOHSW leadership. In subsequent rings, 
the national Incident Management System and county health 
departments joined efforts with CDC, WHO, African Union, 
and multiple nongovernmental organization partners participat-
ing in initial discussions, planning, and rapid IPC assessments. In 
general, HCFs welcomed additional training, personal protective 
equipment provision, and triage mentoring and support. The 
placement of IPC staff members trained in triage at target HCFs 
following training was readily adopted by clinic staff.
The implementation of Ring IPC in Liberia might offer a useful 
model for rapid response to Ebola virus transmission and health 
care worker exposure in other settings. This approach, however, 
might be most appropriate at the beginning or near the end of an 
outbreak, when specific chains of transmission can be identified and 
when HCFs can be identified and targeted based on their risk for 
encountering an Ebola patient when there is known active transmis-
sion in their geographical area. Urban settings present challenges to 
this approach, because persons might seek care at HCFs outside of 
their immediate community. Although limitations in both supplies 
(personal protective equipment and infrared thermometers) and 
human resources (appropriately trained personnel) might inhibit a 
timely response to initiating IPC activities, the Ring IPC approach 
might be used to prioritize these limited resources.
The Ring IPC approach was developed rapidly and collab-
oratively in response to an urgent public health need; as such, 
data were not collected and aggregated systematically across 
all facilities, potentially limiting the generalizability of these 
results. Nonetheless, as a result of Ring IPC efforts, health 
care workers at HCFs in areas with recent active transmission 
are now better equipped and trained to rapidly triage, isolate, 
and refer suspected and probable Ebola patients to appropriate 
Ebola treatment unit facilities. As Liberia looks ahead, a new 
culture of IPC can be incorporated into the health system; a 
Ring IPC approach might be useful in minimizing the trans-
mission in non-Ebola HCFs should new cases of Ebola occur.
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Announcement
Click It or Ticket Campaign — May 18–31, 2015
Click It or Ticket, a national campaign coordinated annually by 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to increase 
the proper use of seat belts, takes place May 18–31, 2015.
Using a seat belt is one of the most effective ways to prevent 
serious injury or death in the event of a crash. Using lap/shoul-
der seat belts can reduce the risk of fatal injury by almost 50% 
(1). In 2013, more than 21,000 passenger vehicle occupants 
died in motor vehicle crashes in the United State; 49% were 
unrestrained at the time of the crash (2). An additional 2.4 
million nonfatal injuries were treated in emergency depart-
ments in 2013 (3). Yet, millions of persons continue to travel 
unrestrained (4).
During the 2015 Click it or Ticket campaign,* law enforce-
ment agencies across the nation will conduct intensive, high-
visibility enforcement of seat belt laws, during both daytime 
and nighttime hours. Nighttime enforcement of seat belt laws 
is encouraged because seat belt use is lower at night (2).
* Additional information is available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/Driving+Safety/
Occupant+Protection.
Additional information from CDC on preventing motor 
vehicle crash-related injuries is available at http://www.cdc.
gov/Motorvehiclesafety. Information on state-specific seat belt 
use and strategies to improve it is available at http://www.cdc.
gov/motorvehiclesafety/seatbelts/states.html.
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Announcement
American Stroke Month and National High Blood 
Pressure Education Month — May 2015
May 2015 is American Stroke Month and National High 
Blood Pressure Education Month. American Stroke Month raises 
awareness of the signs and symptoms of stroke and encourages 
persons to act F.A.S.T.* (Face drooping, Arm weakness, Speech 
difficulty, Time to call 9–1–1) if someone is having a stroke. 
Stroke is the fifth leading cause of death in the United States and 
a leading cause of severe disability (1,2). In the United States, 
on average, one person dies from stroke every 4 minutes (2).
Stroke is largely preventable. You may be able to prevent 
stroke or reduce your risk through healthy lifestyle changes. 
High blood pressure is one of the major risk factors for stroke. 
Others include high cholesterol, smoking, diabetes, heart disease, 
obesity, physical inactivity, and unhealthy diet.†
National High Blood Pressure Education Month focuses on 
saving lives by increasing awareness and educating the public 
about cardiovascular disease risks and how to prevent them. High 
blood pressure, also known as hypertension, is considered the 
“silent killer” because it can damage the heart, brain, and kidneys 
without any symptoms (2). In the United States, nearly one in 
three adults has hypertension, and only about half have their 
condition under control (3). Hypertension is the leading risk 
factor for stroke and heart attacks. Each day in the United States, 
more than 1,000 deaths are associated with hypertension (2).
To control hypertension and reduce their risk for stroke, 
patients can take medications as directed, monitor their blood 
pressure, and eat a lower-sodium diet and more fruits and 
vegetables. Health care providers can use electronic health 
records, blood pressure measurement, and a team-based care 
approach to help improve their patients’ hypertension control. 
Patients and providers can find more information at http://
millionhearts.hhs.gov/abouthds/prevention.html.
CDC focuses on promoting cardiovascular health, improving 
quality of care for all, and eliminating disparities associated 
with heart disease and stroke. Additional information is avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/bloodpressure and http://www.
cdc.gov/stroke.
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* Information on health insurance coverage is collected at the time of interview. Three of the four categories 
(any private, including workplace; public only [Medicare, Medicaid, military, and state/local government 
plans]; and uninsured) are mutually exclusive, but might not sum to 100% because of rounding. 
† Estimates are based on household interviews of a sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized U.S. population 
and are derived from the National Health Interview Survey family core. 
§ 95% confidence interval.
In 2012–2013, persons aged 55–64 years were less likely to have private health insurance coverage (69.8%) than persons in the 
same age group in 2002–2003 (76.7%); persons in the 2012–2013 age group also were less likely to have private coverage through 
the workplace (62.0%) than persons in the same age group in 2002–2003 (69.5%). Also, in 2012–2013, a greater percentage 
aged 55–64 years had only public health insurance coverage (16.9%) than in 2002–2003 (12.1%) and a greater percentage were 
uninsured (13.4%) than in 2002–2003 (11.2%).
Source: Health, United States, 2014 with special feature on the health of the current 55–64 year age group who within the next 10 years will 
enter the Medicare program. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus.htm. 
Reported by: Virginia M. Freid, MS, VFreid@cdc.gov, 301-458-4220; Mary Ann Bush, MS.  
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